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Comment
YOU’RE GETTING OUT EARLY: WELCH V.
UNITED STATES ALLOWS OFFENDERS TO
RETROACTIVELY ATTACK SENTENCES
UNDER THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL
ACT†
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Statute 18 U.S.C. § 924, commonly referred to as the Armed
Career Criminal Act, was enacted to forbid certain types of people to
“ship, possess, and receive firearms” through the imposition of
mandatory minimum sentencing.1 Though many may think the purpose
of the Act is to deter the use of guns by convicted felons, its main purpose
is to incapacitate career criminals through the imposition of mandatory
minimum sentencing.2 In 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Johnson v. United States invalidating the residual clause of the
Armed Career Criminal Act.3 After this decision, the Court had to address
whether the new rule created in Johnson should be retroactively applied to
challenges against prior sentences levied under the Armed Career
Criminal Act’s residual clause.4

Winner of the 2017 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555 (2015). See also Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (explaining that offenders qualifying under the Armed Career
Criminal Act as having committed violent offenses are “potentially more dangerous” when
armed with a weapon, which is the “eponym of the statute”); United States v. Trujillo, 225
F.Supp.3d 1222, 1225 (D. Colo. 2016) (showing that the Armed Career Criminal Act mandates
a 15-year minimum sentence for anyone convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
2
See James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 547–48 (2009) (stating that
“[a]lthough the Armed Career Criminal Act enhances the punishment for illegally
possessing firearms, it does not appear that Congress’s primary intent was to punish career
criminals for possessing guns or to deter such possession.” Instead, “the Armed Career
Criminal Act’s primary goal [is] incapacitating career criminals who are likely to re-offend
and pose a danger to the public if not incarcerated.”).
3
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (explaining that the residual clause of the Armed
Career Criminal Act violates the Fifth Amendments’ Due Process Clause because it is too
vague).
4
See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016) (advising that the Court
granted certiorari to address the broader legal issue of whether the new rule established in
Johnson applied retroactively on collateral review).
†
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Generally, the Court strictly limits when rules will have retroactive
application.5 In determining whether a new constitutional principle
applies retroactively the Court must decide whether the new rule is a
substantive or procedural change.6 In Welch v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court held that the new rule in Johnson was a substantive
change to the law and should apply retroactively to cases brought on
collateral appeal.7
First, this Comment presents the facts of Welch v. United States.8 Next,
this Comment discussed the Court’s history of retroactive application of
new rules to cases on collateral appeal, focusing particularly on the
distinction between substantive and procedural rules. 9 Finally, this
Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s holding in Welch and what the
Court failed to address in its decision, and the implications of the decision
going forward. 10
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN WELCH V. UNITED STATES
In 2010, police went to Gregory Welch’s apartment looking for a
robbery suspect who had shot two people during an attempted robbery.11
After entering the apartment, police encountered Welch in a bedroom and
gained consent to search the apartment for the weapon involved in the
robbery.12 The search uncovered a weapon in the attic which Welch later
admitted was his.13 Welch later plead guilty to being a felon in possession
5
See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (noting that concerns of finality
lead the Court to limit “the circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on
collateral review.”). See also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (stating that the general
rule is that a new rule does not have retroactive application unless it is a substantive rule or
a watershed rule of criminal procedure).
6
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (adopting the test for retroactive application of new rules as
whether the rule is a substantive or procedural rule). See also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621 (stating
that the “distinction between substance and procedure is an important one in the habeus
context.”).
7
See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265 (holding that Johnson is a substantive decision and should
therefore be given retroactive application).
8
See infra Part II (providing the factual background of Welch v. United States).
9
See infra Part III (discussing the history of retroactive application based on whether the
new rule created is substantive or procedural).
10
See infra Part IV (analyzing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Welch v. United States by
considering a factor that the court failed to address and possible issues related to Welch going
forward).
11
See Welch, 683 F.3d at 1306 (providing the reason why police went to Welch’s
apartment).
12
See id. (outlining how the police gained consent to search Welch’s apartment).
13
See id. at 1306–07 (upholding the search of Welch’s apartment). Welch challenged the
validity of the search, but the Eleventh Circuit upheld the search as constitutional based on
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of a firearm.14 Due to his prior three violent felony convictions, Welch
was categorized as an armed career criminal and sentenced to the
minimum fifteen-year sentence imposed by the Armed Career Criminal
Act.15
On appeal, Welch argued that his conviction for robbery, which was
used to subject him to the minimum sentencing standards of the Armed
Career Criminal Act, was not a violent felony as defined by the statute.16
However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and upheld Welch’s fifteen-year
sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.17 The Supreme Court
later granted certiorari in Welch’s case to consider whether Johnson had
created a new rule that should apply retroactively to sentences under the
Armed Career Criminal Act.18
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF WELCH V. UNITED STATES
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
“no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”19 In Johnson, the Supreme Court found that the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was so vague that a normal
person could not determine which conduct was being criminalized. 20
Therefore, the Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career
Criminal Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process
Clause of the 5th Amendment.21

the initial protective sweep that the police conducted and Welch’s subsequent consent of the
search of the apartment. See id. at 1307.
14
See id. at 1306 (discussing that the police searched the attic of Welch’s apartment and
discovered a weapon which Welch subsequently stated was his gun).
15
See id. at 1307 (examining Welch’s prior criminal history in designating him eligible for
the minimum fifteen-year sentence imposed by the Armed Career Criminal Act).
16
See Welch, 683 F.3d at 1310–14 (outlining Welch’s argument that he should not have
been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act because his prior theft conviction was
not a crime of violence).
17
See id. at 1313–14 (upholding Welch’s sentence). The Court never decided whether
Welch’s robbery conviction met the definition of a violent felony under the elements clause
of the Armed Career Criminal Act because the Court found that it met the requirements for
the residual clause and stopped at that. See id. at 1313.
18
See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (stating that the broad issue in Welch was whether the new
rule in Johnson should apply retroactively).
19
U.S. CONST., amend V.
20
See Welch, 136 S. Ct at 1262 (stating that “in the Johnson Court’s view . . . the residual
clause [was] more unpredictable and arbitrary in its application than the Constitution
allows”).
21
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (proclaiming that the “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging
inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites
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Traditionally, when the court creates a new rule of criminal law by
invalidating part of a statute, they must next decide whether that rule is
going to have retroactive application to cases that have already been
adjudicated under the old rule.22 Early on, the Court struggled with
finding a consistent standard for deciding when a new rule should or
should not apply retroactively, and Justice Harlan attempted to persuade
the Court to accept his proposed standard without success.23 Finally, after
years of grasping to find a working test for when retroactive application
applies, the Court adopted Justice’s Harlan’s approach in Teague v. Lane.24
Teague, which is the current test that the Court applies, hinges on whether
the new rule created is substantive or procedural.25 The Teague analysis,
generally, starts with the assumption that the interests of finality are so
strong that retroactive application is not allowed.26 However, the
Supreme Court has carved out two exceptions to this general rule, and
allowed retroactive application on collateral appeal where: (1) the new
rule is a substantive change; or (2) when the new rule is a watershed rule
of fairness in criminal procedure. 27
arbitrary enforcement by judges” and by “increasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause
denies due process of law.”).
22
Compare Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 232, 245 (1990) (holding that imposition of the
death penalty by sentencer that had false belief that the responsibility lied elsewhere was not
afforded retroactive application) with Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016)
(providing that the new rule stating that juveniles could not be sentenced to life without
parole would be afforded retroactive application).
23
See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (outlining
a three-consideration test to decide whether a new rule applied retroactively). In Williams v.
United States, Justice Harlan wrote a separate opinion to dissent to the way the court was
reviewing retroactive application. Id. See also Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676
(1971) (criticizing the way the Court was reviewing retroactive application). In criticizing
the Court’s evaluation of retroactive application, Justice Harlan stated that “the Court is free
to act, in effect, like a legislature, making its new constitutional rules wholly or partially
retroactive or only prospective as it deems wise” and that Justice Harlan “completely
disagree[s] with this point of view.” Id. at 677.
24
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (explaining that the Court has adopted Justice Harlan’s view
of retroactivity for cases on collateral review).
25
See In re Patrick, 833 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that substantive changes in the
law created by a new rule are retroactive, while procedural changes to the law are not).
26
See Desist, 394 U.S. at 254 (holding that new rule concerning electronic surveillance law
was not applied retroactively to cases that had been decided before the rule change). See also
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990) (holding that new rule barring police-initiated
interrogation after request for counsel was not given retroactive application to collateral
appeals); Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013) (holding that retroactive
application was not appropriate where court held that counsel was required to explain
deportation risks to their clients arising out of a guilty plea).
27
See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (stating that when a decision has become final, the only way
that retroactive application to collateral appeal will be allowed is where the new rule created
is substantive or it is a watershed rule of criminal procedure).
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In Teague, the Court explained that a new rule is substantive when it
“alters the range of conduct or class of person that the law punishes.” 28
Furthermore, the Court has stated that a watershed rule of criminal
procedure is a new rule that is fundamental in ensuring a fair criminal
proceeding.29 Courts have rarely used the watershed exception in
applying retroactivity to a new rule, and they have mostly concentrated
on whether the new rule is either substantive or procedural.30 If the rule
is found to be substantive it has retroactive applicability, while new
procedural rules are not given retroactive effect.31
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN WELCH V. UNITED STATES
A. The Welch v. United States Decision
In a seven-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held in Welch that the
new rule created by the Court in Johnson, invalidating the residual clause
of the Armed Career Criminal Act, applied retroactively to cases brought
on collateral appeal.32 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by
briefly discussing the Johnson decision and stating that the Court was
reviewing the denial of a Certificate of Appealability for Welch to file his
successive § 2255 habeus petition.33 Justice Kennedy, with very little
discussion as to why the Certificate of Appealability should be issued,
See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (explaining that a “decision that modifies
the elements of an offense is normally substantive rather than procedural.”).
29
See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (stating that the second exception created
under Teague is the “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”).
30
See Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 243 (discussing the limited use of the watershed rule exception).
In Sawyer, Justice Kennedy quoted Teague and explained that finding that a new rule is a
watershed rule of criminal procedure is very unlikely because it is unlikely that such
fundamental bedrocks of due process have emerged yet. Id. See also Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S.
406, 417 (2004) (stating that a watershed rule of criminal procedure “is clearly meant to apply
only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit to
the concept of ordered liberty.” (citations omitted)).
31
See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (stating that procedural rules have no retroactive application
because “unless a new rule of criminal procedure is of such a nature that without [it] the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished, there is no reason to apply the
rule retroactively on habeus review.”).
32
See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268 (finding that Johnson establish a new substantive rule that
has retroactive effect). The majority in Welch consisted of Justice Kennedy, who delivered
the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Only eight Justices
participated in the decision due to the passing of the late Justice Scalia. Id. at 1260.
33
See id. at 1263–64 (stating that the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to deny Welch’s
motion to bring a successive § 2255 petition because he failed to show an entitlement for
relief and that a reasonable jurist would find that undebatable).
28
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then turned to the retroactive application of the new rule created in
Johnson.34 The Court began this discussion by looking at the language of
the Armed Career Criminal Act and the residual clause located under the
definition of a violent felony.35 He explained that the Court in Johnson
found the residual clause unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine of the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment.36
After establishing why the Johnson Court found the residual clause
unconstitutional, the Court next turned to the broader issue presented in
Welch; should the rule established in Johnson apply retroactively to people
who had already been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s
residual clause.37 The Court answered this question by analyzing the new
rule under the Teague framework, which hinged on whether the new rule
was a substantive or procedural change to the law. 38 The government
attempted to argue that the rule was procedural because it was
invalidated under procedural due process principles.39 The Court
rejected this argument, however, stating that the constitutional principle
which invalidated the law is not part of the analysis under Teague and
found that the new rule was a substantive change because it changed “the
range of conduct and the class of persons” that could be punished under
the law.40 Therefore, the Court held that because the new rule was a

34
See id. at 1264 (asserting that some reasonable jurists would find the issue debatable,
then turning to the issue of retroactive application).
35
See id. at 1261 (reciting the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause under the
definition of a violent felony and discussing the minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen
years for violation of the Act by possessing a firearm after three or more serious drug offenses
or violent felonies). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)’s definition of a “violent felony”, there
are two sections. Section (i) referred to as the elements clause, defines a violent felony as a
crime which “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another.” Section (ii) contains the residual clause which encompasses
crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” The Court in Johnson found the residual clause unconstitutional but the
elements clause and the enumerated offenses in Section (ii) remained in force. 135 S. Ct. at
2563.
36
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (discussing why the residual clause violates the Fifth
Amendment).
37
See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (advising that the broader legal issue of Welch is whether
Johnson should be applied retroactively).
38
See id. (showing when retroactivity is appropriate).
39
See id. at 1266 (stating that when the Court is deciding whether a new rule should be
retroactively applied, the Court should look to the underlying constitutional principle that
created the new rule and decide whether that constitutional principle is procedural or
substantive instead of the new rule itself).
40
See id. at 1265–66 (rejecting the idea of applying the underlying constitutional principle
test advanced by the government, stating that it “would untether the Teague framework from
its basic purpose.”).
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substantive change to the law, the new rule created in Johnson could be
retroactively applied on collateral appeal.41
B. Appraisal of the Welch v. United States Decision
The Court in Welch reached the correct decision when it decided that
the new rule created in Johnson was a substantive rule and as such, should
be applied retroactively. 42 The new rule created in Johnson changed the
class of persons the law effects because someone that would have been
sentenced to the fifteen-year minimum imposed before would not be
subjected to the same sentence after the Court invalidated the residual
clause.43 The Court, however, failed to fully discuss whether Welch
should have been issued a Certificate of Appealability to bring his case on
a successive habeus petition, when the District Court found Welch’s
sentence appropriate under the elements clause and the residual clause of
the Armed Career Criminal Act.44
To bring his case before the Court, Welch was required to obtain a
Certificate of Appealability, which the Court should only grant when “a
reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether defendant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 45 Therefore,
for the Court to issue Welch a Certificate of Appealability, Welch should
have been required to show that he was sentenced under the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act by the District Court and not the
elements clause.46 If Welch was sentenced under the elements clause, his
See id. at 1268 (holding that the rule in Johnson should apply retroactively in Welch).
See generally Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (involving a new sentencing rule which stated
that juveniles could not be sentenced to life prison sentences without the possibility of parole
and the Court, similar to Welch, found that the new rule was a substantive change to the law
and could be applied retroactively because it changed the class of persons that the law
punished).
43
See Welch, 134 S. Ct. at 1265 (advising that an offender would be facing a sentence of 15
years to life in prison if convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act, but that the same
offender would now only be subjected to a ten-year maximum sentence when not subjected
to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s mandatory minimum sentencing).
44
See id. at 1262 (explaining that the District Court found that that Welch’s offense of
strong-arm robbery qualified under both the elements clause and the residual clause of the
Armed Career Criminal Act).
45
See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (stating that “[t]he petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong”). See also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)
(stating that until a Certificate of Appealability is issued on petition for habeus relief, the
federal courts lacks jurisdiction).
46
See Montoya v. United States, 2016 WL 6810727, *1 (D. Utah 2016) (stating that to be
able to file a habeus petition, defendant was required to show that at least one of his
convictions no longer qualifies as a crime of violence). See also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337–38
41
42
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claim would not fall within the scope of the of the new rule created in
Johnson because his conviction would fall outside the residual clause and
the Court would not have issued the Certificate of Appealability for Welch
to bring his case.47
At the end of the Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy briefly concedes
that there has not been a determination on whether Welch’s armed
robbery conviction meets the elements clause of the Armed Career
Criminal Act.48 He, however, justifies the Court’s position by stating that
“reasonable jurists at least could debate” whether the conviction meets the
elements clause.49 However, numerous jurisdictions have found that at
least some level of their state’s robbery laws have met the elements
clause’s requirements.50 If Welch’s armed robbery conviction does qualify
under the element’s clause, and he was sentenced appropriately under
that clause, he would have been unable to show that the District Court
sentenced him under the residual clause to bring a claim that he was
denied a constitutional right under Johnson.51 Therefore, the Court should
have determined if Welch was sentenced under the elements clause of the
Armed Career Criminal Act, because if so, he would not have a Johnson
claim and they should not have issued a Certificate of Appealability to
then decide the retroactive application issue. 52

(stating that the issuance of Certificates of Appealability should not be a “matter of course”
and that it is the defendant’s burden to show more than “the absence of frivolity”).
47
See Ziglar v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (stating that to
bring a § 2255 claim for retroactive applicability of the new rule created in Johnson, a prisoner
must “show that he was sentenced under the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal
Act and that he falls within the scope of the new substantive rule announced in Johnson.”).
48
See Welch, 134 S. Ct. at 1268 (explaining that on remand the Court of Appeals may well
find that Welch’s arm robbery conviction qualifies under the elements clause and his fifteenyear sentence will be upheld whether Johnson applies retroactively or not).
49
Id.
50
See Jondavid S. Delong, Annotation, What Constitutes “Violent Felony” for Purpose of
Sentence Enhancement Under Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C.A § 924(e)(1)), 119 A.L.R.
Fed. 319, § 20 Robbery (1994) (outlining that at least some level of the robbery statutes of
Tennessee, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Colorado, Oregon, Kentucky, Texas, Virginia, South
Carolina, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, and
Massachusetts have been found by courts to qualify as a violent felony for purposes of
sentencing an offender to the fifteen-year minimum sentence under the Armed Career
Criminal Act).
51
See Zigler, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (discussing that defendants are required to show that
the court sentenced them under the residual clause and not the elements clause, to fall within
the scope of Johnson, and to argue that he should be issued a Certificate of Appealability).
52
See Welch, 134 S. Ct. at 1269 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (outlining the fault in issuing the
Certificate of Appealability and stating that these “deficiencies should preclude us from
deciding in this case whether Johnson is retroactive).
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C. Anticipated Consequences of the Welch v. United States Decision
Moving forward, the Court will have to decide whether the new rule
created in Johnson applies retroactively to sentences levied under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines.53 The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in United States v. Beckles to decide whether the invalidation of
the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act in Johnson will apply
retroactively to the “almost identical” language of a violent felony in the
United States Sentencing Guidelines.54 Circuits have differed in whether
Johnson applies retroactively to the Sentencing Guidelines, and the
decision may not be so straightforward because the Sentencing Guidelines
are advisory.55 If the Court fails to apply Johnson retroactively to sentences
levied under the almost same language in the Sentencing Guidelines,
offenders will be unable to bring a collateral appeal of their sentences
despite being sentenced under essentially the same language.56
V. CONCLUSION
In Welch, the Court correctly decided that the new rule in Johnson was
substantive and should be retroactively applied. However, the Court
should not have come to this issue in Welch. The Court should not have
issued a Certificate of Appealability for Welch to bring his successive
§2255 petition without thoroughly discussing whether a reasonable jurist
would find it debatable that Welch was denied a constitutional right. If
they had thoroughly considered the issue, it is likely that Welch could
have been denied the Certificate of Appealability because his prior
conviction was a crime of violence under the elements clause of the Armed
Career Criminal Act. By allowing offenders to bring their claims when the
underlying crime meets the requirements of the elements clause, the Court
has subjected the circuit courts to needless re-sentencing decisions where

See, e.g., In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2016) (deciding that the new rule in
Johnson applies to the United States Sentencing Guidelines).
54
See United States v. Walker, 214 F. Supp.3d 866, 873 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (stating that the
U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Beckles, and discussing the issues that will likely
be decided in the case).
55
See In re Partick, 833 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that the Second, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have found that Johnson applies retroactively to the
Sentencing Guidelines). But see United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 846 (11th Cir. 2009)
(upholding a conviction under the crime of violence definition similar to the residual clause
in the Sentencing Guidelines).
56
See Beckles, 565 F.3d at 842 (upholding sentence under the crime of violence definition
in § 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines despite its almost identical language to the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act).
53
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the same fifteen-year sentence will be imposed under the elements clause
of the same Act.
Carl J. Hall*
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